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THE NRC REPORT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
Paul C. Giannelli*
ABSTRACT: The National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), issued a landmark report on forensic science in February 2009.
In the long run, the report's recommendations, if adopted, would benefit law enforcement and prosecutors. The recommendations would allow forensic science to develop a
strong scientific basis and limit evidentiary challenges regarding the reliability of
forensic evidence. In keeping with its congressional charge, however, the NRC committee did not directly address admissibility issues. Nevertheless, given its content, the
report will inevitably be cited in criminal cases. Indeed, within months, the United
States Supreme Court cited the report, noting that "[s]erious deficiencies have been
1
found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials." Defense attorneys would be
derelict if they did not use it, and prosecutors will have no choice but to respond to
defense arguments. This essay examines how courts may respond to the NRC report in
the near future.

CITATION: Paul C. Giannelli, The NRC Report and Its Implications for Criminal
Litigation, 50 Jurimetrics J. 53-66 (2009).

The National Research Council's report 2 on forensic science undoubtedly
will have a profound impact on crime laboratories and the judicial system. The
report's findings are significant: "Among existing forensic methods, only
nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a specific individual or source." 3 Although
commentators 4 and some courts had made this point before, such a finding,
coming from one of the nation's most prestigious scientific organizations,
carries far more authority. Moreover, the report noted that in some cases faulty
forensic analyses may have contributed to the wrongful conviction of innocent
defendants. 5
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University.
I. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
2. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
3. /d. at l 00.
4. See generally Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigrnan, Failed Forensics: How Forensic
Science Lost Its Way And How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 149 (2008);
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008).
5. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 42, 100. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J.
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REv. I (2009);
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Of course, the extent of the report's impact depends on which of its recommendations are implemented. Adoption of all recommendations would be
the most important development in forensic science since the establishment of
the crime laboratory in the mid-1920s. 6 Some recommendations are structural-that is, the creation of an in-dependent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic Sciences (NIFS), to oversee the field 7 and the removal of
crime laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies.8 Other recommendations could be adopted independently of these structural reforms, as the report acknowledges. 9 For example, legislatures could
mandate the accreditation of crime laboratories, as a few states have done. 10
Similarly, recommendations concerning research to determine the reliability of
forensic evidence 11 and the consequences of human observer bias 12 could be
funded even in the absence of an independent agency. 13 These objectives,
however, are all long-term goals. This essay focuses on short-term consequences: How courts may respond to the NRC report in the near future.

I. ADMISSffiiLITY ISSUES
In keeping with its congressional charge, the NRC committee did not
directly address admissibility issues. The report states: "No judgment is made
about past convictions and no view is expressed as to whether courts should
reassess cases that already have been tried." 14 When the report was released,
the co-chair of the NRC committee stated:
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs,
86 N.C. L. REv. 163 (2007).
6. "The oldest forensic laboratory in the United States is that of the Los Angeles Police
Department, created in 1923 by August Vollmer, a police chief from Berkeley, California."
RICHARD SAPERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 6 (5th ed.
I 995). "In I 923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles for a period of one
year. During that time, a crime laboratory was established at his direction." John I. Thornton,
Criminalistics-Past, Present, and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA I, 23 (1975).
7. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, recommendation 1, at 81-82.
8./d., recommendation 4, at 190-91.
9. "The remaining recommendations in this report are crucially tied to the creation of NIFS.
However, each recommendation is a separate, essential piece of the plan to improve the forensic
science community in the United States. Therefore, even if the creation of NIPS is forestalled, the
committee vigorously supports the adoption of the core ideas and principles embedded in each of
the following recommendations." !d. at 20-21.
10. E.g., N.Y. EXEC. § 995-b (McKinney 2009) (requiring accreditation by the state Forensic
Science Commission); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (2004) (requiring accreditation by the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLDILAB)
or the American Board of Forensic Toxicology); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon
2004) (requiring accreditation by the Department of Public Safety). Texas also created a Forensic
Science Commission. !d. art. 38.0 l.
I l. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, recommendation 3, at 190.
12. !d., recommendation 5, at 191.
13. The NRC committee, however, found that "the research funding strategies of DOJ have
not adequately served the broad needs of the forensic science community." !d. at 18. Thus,
whether the report will trigger a different approach remains problematic.
14. !d. at 85. The report goes on to state: "The report finds that the existing legal regimeincluding the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards
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I want to make it clear that the committee's report does not mean to offer any
judgments on any cases in the judicial system. The report does not assess past
criminal convictions, nor does it speculate about pending or future cases. And
the report offers no proposals for law reform. That was beyond our charge.
Each case in the criminal justice system must be decided on the record before
the court pursuant to the applicable law, controlling precedent, and governing
rules of evidence. The question whether forensic evidence in a particular case
is admissible under applicable law is not coterminous with the question
whether there are studies confirming the scientific validity and reliability of a
15
forensic science discipline.

Nevertheless, given its content, the report will inevitably be cited in cases.
Defense attorneys would be derelict if they did not use it, and prosecutors will
have no choice but to respond to defense arguments. Indeed, within months,
the United States Supreme Court was citing the report, noting that "[s]erious
deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials."16
It remains to be seen, however, how much impact the report will have and
how soon that influence will be felt. Prior to the report, the courts had been
extremely reluctant to scrutinize closely many forensic techniques, such as
fingerprint examinations, 17 firearms (ballistics) identifications, 18 and handwriting comparisons. 19 The report acknowledged that "some courts appear to be
loath to insist on [empirical] research as a condition of admitting forensic
science evidence in criminal cases, perhaps because to do so would likely
'demand more by way of validation than the disciplines can presently offer. "'20 Indeed, commentators had noted 21 and studies had confirmed the exisgoverning appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and
judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate
forensic evidence-is inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science
disciplines." Id.
15. The Honorable Harry T. Edwards, Co-Chair, Forensic Sci. Comm., Opening Statement at
the Release of the NRC Report (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/OS
Edwards. pdf.
16. Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2527,2537 (2009).
17. "Overall, what is most striking about the judicial response to the challenges to fingerprinting is a general reluctance to admit that assessing fingerprinting under Daubert raises tricky
issues." Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 13, 66 (2001). See also Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic
Science (Especially Fingerpn"nt Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1173-76
(2003) (discussing the reversal of the burden of persuasion as one of several judicial responses
employed to avoid confronting the lack of empirical testing).
18. See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of
Fireanns and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
19. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REv. 1723, 1844 (2001); D.
Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets
Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 65 (1996).
20. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting Joan Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert
Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, 26 CHAMPION 20, 21 (Sept.Oct. 2002)).
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tence of a double standard, under which federal courts apply a more stringent
admissibility standard in civil cases than in criminal cases. 22 The report recognized this development as well, noting that "the appellate courts appear to be
more willing to second-guess trial court judgments on the admissibility of
purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases." 23
Yet, a few judges have been willing to tackle the issue. For example,
dissenting in a fingerprint and handwriting comparison case, Judge Michael
argued that "[t]he government has .had ten years to comply with Daubert. It
should not be given a pass in this case." 24 Similarly, in a cartridge identification case, Judge Gertner admonished her peers: "The more courts admit this
type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we
should require more." 25 Significantly, some courts viewed the Supreme
Court's Daubert trilogl 6 as "inviting a reexamination even of 'generally ac-

21. "(T]he heightened standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil
cases has continued to expand, but ... expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has
been largely insulated from any change in pre-Dauben standards or approach." D. Michael
Risinger, Navigating Expen Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Cenaillty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99, 149 (2000).
22. Compare Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 364 (2002)
(stating that "the Dauben decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at
either the trial or the appellate court levels"), with LLOYD DIXON & BRJAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT
DECISION 25 (200 l) (stating that "since Daub en, judges have examined the reliability of expert
evidence more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result"). See also Margaret
A. Berger, Upsetting the Baiance Between Adverse !me rests: The Impact of the Supreme Court"s
Trilogy on Expe11 Testimony in Toxic Ton Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290
(200 l) ("The Federal Judicial Center conducted surveys in 1991 and 1998 asking federal judges
and attorneys about expert testimony. In the 1991 survey, seventy-five percent of the judges
reported admitting all proffered expert testimony. By 1998, only fifty-nine percent indicated that
they admitted all proffered expert testimony without limitation. Furthermore, sixty-five percent of
plaintiff and defendant counsel stated that judges are less likely to admit some types of expert
testimony since Daubert.").
23. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
24. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting).
25. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005). In United States v.
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), Judge Pollak ruled that fingerprint experts
would not be permitted to testify that two sets of prints "matched"-that is, a positive identification to the exclusion of all other persons. !d. at 552. This was the first time in nearly 100 years that
such a decision had been rendered. On rehearing, however, Judge Pollak reversed himself, and
later cases would continue to uphold the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. !d. at 576. See also
D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprillting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINN!PlAC L.
REv. 1073, 1073 (2003) ("The ruling sent shock waves through the community of fingerprint
analysts, the FBI, and the Department of Justice.").
26. The Supreme Court revolutionized the standards for admitting expert testimony in
Dauben v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which was followed by Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kwnho Tire Co. v. CamJichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Daubert has been transformed over time. In Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the
Supreme Court referred to Daubert as imposing "exacting standards of reliability." !d. at 455.
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cepted' venerable, technical fields." 27 Moreover, the Second Circuit has written that the Supreme Court did not '"grandfather' or protect from Daubert
scrutiny evidence that had previously been admitted under F1ye," 28 the previous test for admitting scientific evidence in federal court. 29 The report will
provide support for those judges willing to grapple with the issue and ammunition for defense attorneys who talce their responsibilities seriously. Possible
developments are discussed below.

II. EXAGGERATIONS
Several common types of testimonial assertions should now be unaccept30
able at trial. The NRC report criticized "exaggerated" testimony, such as
claims of perfect accuracy, infallibility, or a zero error rate.

A. Claims of Zero Error Rate
In United States v. Havvard, 31 which involved a Daubert challenge to
fingerprint evidence, the expert claimed "the enor rate for the method is
zero." 32 Note the word method in the above quotation. Examiners argued that,
while individual examiners may make mistakes, the method itself is perfect.
However, the dichotomy between "methodological" and "human" error rates
in this context is "practically meaningless" 33 because the examiner is the
method. 34

27. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwiiting compaiison).
See also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) ("Courts are now
confronting challenges to testimony ... whose admissibility had long been settled.").
28. United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir. 2007).
29. At the time Daube11 was decided, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
was the leading case on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Under Frye, the admissibility of
expert testimony depended on its "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
!d. at 1014. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Inter, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980) (criticizing F1ye).
30. "[l]mprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes contributed to the admission of erroneous or misleading evidence." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
31. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D.lnd. 2000), aff'd, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
32. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
33. Mnookin, supra note 17, at60. Professor Mnookin goes on to provide this analogy: "The
same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable form of evidence.
People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of
eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently make errors." !d.
See also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounfing for Error in Intent Fingerprillt
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1040 (2005) ("in fingerprint practice the
concept is vacuous"). Professor Cole identified twenty-two misidentifications, which he argues
"are most likely only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of actual cases of fingerprint misattribution."
!d. at 991. The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) verification by one or more
other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the International Association of Identification, (3)
procedures using a sixteen-point standard, and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made by prosecution experts. See id. at 1001-17.
34. See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerp1int Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 143, 172 (2005) ("But,
given its unavoidable subjective component, in latent print examination people are the process.").
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The NRC report addressed this point: "Although there is limited information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses, claims that
these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible." 35 Furthermore, there already is judicial support for this position. For example, in United
States v. Mitchell, 36 the Third Circuit commented: "Testimony at the Daubert
hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint examiners insist that there is no
error rate associated with their activities .... This would be out-of-place under
Rule 702 [which governs expert testimony]." 37

B. Claims of One Hundred Percent Accuracy
In a firearms identification case, United States v. Monteiro, 38 the court
noted that "the examiners testified to the effect that they could be 100 percent
sure of a match. Because an examiner's bottom line opinion as to an identification is largely a subjective one, there is no reliable statistical or scientific
methodology which will currently permit the expert to testify that it is a
'match' to an absolute certainty, or to an arbitrary degree of statistical certainty."39 The report concurred: "The insistence by some forensic practitioners
that their disciplines employ methodologies that have perfect accuracy and
produce no errors has hampered efforts to evaluate the usefulness of the forensic science disciplines." 40

C. Scientific?
The use of terms such as science or scientific in presenting expert testimony may also be problematic. In 1995, a federal district court in United
States v. Starzecpyzez4 1 concluded that "forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and other
trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific ...
knowledge."' 42 The court further stated "that while scientific principles may
relate to aspects of handwriting analysis, they have little or nothing to do with
the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic Document Examiners (FDEs)]
.... [T]his attenuated relationship does not transform the FDE into a scientist. " 43

35. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 142. "Some in the latent print community argue that the
method itself, if followed correctly ... has a zero error rate. Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic
.... The method, and the performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both
involve multiple sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in
human judgment)." !d. at 143.
36. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
37. !d. at 246.
38. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
39. !d. at 372.
40. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
41. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
42. !d. at 1038 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
43. !d. at 1041.
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Although the court went on to admit the testimony as technical evidence,
it placed conditions on its admissibility. 44 Because FDEs use terms such as
"laboratory" and refer to authorities with titles containing the words "science"
or "scientific," there is a risk, according to the court, that jurors may bestow
upon FDEs the aura of the infallibility of science. 45 Consequently, these terms
should not be used in the expert's testimony. Moreover, the court approved a
jury instruction, which stated "that FDEs offer practical, rather than scientific
expertise." 46 Similarly, in United States v. Glynn, 47 a firearms identification
case, the court ruled: "Based on the Daubert hearings this Court conducted ...
the Court very quickly concluded that whatever else ballistics identification
analysis could be called, it could not fairly be called 'science. "'48
The NRC report also supports this position: "The law's greatest dilemma
in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence . . . concerns the question of
whether-and to what extent-there is science in any given forensic science
discipline." 49 A subsequent passage concludes: "Much forensic evidenceincluding, for example, bite marks and firearm and toolmark identificationsis introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation,
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the
discipline. " 50

D. Claims of to the Exclusion of All Others
Experts frequently testify that they have made a match "'to the exclusion
of all other firearms. "' 51 In United States v. Green, 52 the court questioned such
testimony: "O'Shea [the expert] declared that this match could be made 'to the
exclusion of every other firearm in the world.' ... That conclusion, needless to
say, is extraordinary, particularly given O'Shea's data and methods." 53 Further, in 2008, a year before the NRC report on forensic science was issued, a
different NRC report, one on computerized ballistic imaging, addressed this
issue. The 2008 NRC ballistic imaging report cautioned: "Conclusions drawn
in fireanns identification should not be made to imply the presence of a finn

44. In the court's view, Daube11 did not apply to nonscientific experts. !d. at 1041-42. The
court relied on the following statement in Daubert: "Our discussion is limited to the scientific
context because that is the natore of the expertise offered here." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharrns.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 578, 590 n.8 (1993). This position was undercut by Kwnho Tire, which held that all
expert testimony must pass the Daube11 reliability test. Kumho Tire Co. v. Cannichael, 526 U.S.
137, 149 (1999).
45. Starzecpyze/, 880 F. Supp. at 1029.
46. !d. at 1049.
47. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
48. !d. at 570.
49. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
50. !d. at 107-08.
51. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMwiNKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §
14.01, at 706 n.1 (4th ed. 2007) (citing FBI HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 57 (rev. ed. 1994)).
52. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
53. !d. at 107 (citations omitted).
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statistical basis when none has been denwnstrated." 54 In particular, the NRC
ballistic imaging report was concerned about testimony cast "in bold absolutes," such as that a match can be made to the exclusion of all other firearms
in the world: "Such comments cloak an inherently subjective assessment of a
match with an extreme probability statement that has no firm grounding and
unrealistically implies an error rate of zero." 55

E. Claims of Reasonable Scientific Certainty
The expression reasonable scientific certainty, which is often included
(and sometimes demanded) in expert testimony, is another phrase that should
come under attack. The phrase, which combines two suspect words-scientific
and certainty-has no scientific meaning. Although it is used frequently in
cases, its legal meaning is ambiguous at best. Sometimes it is used in lieu of a
confidence statement-that is, "I am confident of my opinion."-in which
-case the expert could avoid the term altogether and directly testify how confident she is in her opinion. 56
In other cases, courts have interpreted the phrase to mean that the expert
must testify that a sample probably came from the defendant and not that it
possibly came from him. In State v. Holt, 57 for instance, the expert testified,
based on neutron activation analysis, that two hair samples were "similar and
... likely to be from the same source." 58 The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
expert testimony is admissible only if the opinion is based upon reasonable
scientific certainty. 59 For that court, reasonable scientific certainty meant that
the expert had to testify that the hair sample probably came from the defendant
and not that it possibly came from him. 60

54. COMM. TO ASSESS THE FEASffiiLITY, ACCURACY, AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF A
NAT'L BALLISTIC DATABASE ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
BALLISTIC IMAGING 82 (2008) [hereinafter NRC BALLISTIC IMAGING].
55. !d.
56. "[T]here is nevertheless an undercurrent that the expert in federal court express some
basis for both the confidence with which his conclusion is formed, and the probability that his
conclusion is accurate." James E. Hullverson, Jr., Reasonable Degree of Medical Certainty: A
Tort eta Travers, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 577, 582 (1987). "Many courts continue to exclude opinions which fall short of expressing a probability or certainty ___ . These opinions have even been
excluded in jurisdictions which have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence." Edward J_
Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an Accused's Constitutional Right to

Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science Evidence: The Antidote
for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 69
(1991).
57_ 246 N.E.2d 365 (Ohio 1969).
58. !d. at 368 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. The requirement that experts testify in terms of probability may have originated as a
"sufficiency" rule in civil cases in which causation was an issue. Generally, expert testimony
concerning causation (more probable than not) is required to avoid a directed verdict. This sufficiency rule may then have been improperly converted into an "admissibility" rule in civil cases
and then improperly transplanted into criminal cases. See l PAUL C. GIANNELLI & BARBARA
ROOK SNYDER, BALDWIN'S OHIO PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 702.6 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the
Ohio experience with the term).
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Holt is wrong. Experts frequently testify that two samples "could have
come from the same source" or "were likely to be from the same source." 61
Such testimony meets the relevancy standard of Federal Rule 40 I, and there is
no requirement in the Federal Rules of Evidence that an expert's opinion be
expressed in terms of "probabilities." Thus, in United States v. Cyphers, 62 the
expert testified that hair samples found on items used in a robbery "could have
come" from the defendants. 63 The defendants argued that the testimony was
inadmissible because the expert did not express his opinion in terms of "reasonable scientific certainty." The court responded: "There is no such requirement."64
In United States v. Glynn, 65 the court ruled tl1at the term reasonable scientific certainty could not be used in a firearms identification case. 66 In light of
the expert's admission concerning the subjective nature of the examination,
"the Government did not seriously contest the Court's conclusions that ballistics lacked the rigor of science and that, whatever else it might be, its methodology was too subjective to permit opinions to be stated to 'a reasonable
degree of ballistic certainty. "' 67

ill. LIMITATIONS ON SCOPE OF TESTIMONY
The NRC report should buttress defense efforts to limit the scope of handwriting testimony, permitting expert testimony about the similarities and dissimilarities between exemplars, but not the specific conclusion that the
defendant was tl1e author, sometimes referred to as a "common authorship"
opinion. 68 Although the courts have used this approach most frequently in
61. See, e.g., People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228, 236 (Cal. 2004) (expert "opined that both
bullets and the casing could have been fired from the same gun ... because of their condition he
could not say for sure"); Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1997) (expert
"testified only that the bullets which killed the victim could have been fired from Luttrell's gun");
State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 539-40 (N.C. 1982); Commonwealth v. Moore, 340 A.2d 447,
451 (Pa. 1975).
62. 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977).
63. /d. at 1072. See also United States v. Davis, 44 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Evidence
was also adrrritted that appellant owned sneakers which 'could have' made these prints.").
64. Cyphers, 553 F.2d at 1072. See also State v. Boyer, 406 So. 2d 143, 148 (La. 1981)
(reasonable scientific certainty not required where expert testifies concerning the presence of
gunshot residue based on neutron activation analysis).
65. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
66./d. at 574--75.
67./d. at 571.
68. "Many other district courts have sirrrilarly· perrrritted a handwriting expert to analyze a
writing sample for the jury without perrrritting the expert to offer an opinion on the ultimate question of authorship." United States v. Oskowitz, 294 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). "[1]he
Court concludes that FDE Rauscher's testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702 to the extent
that he lirrrits his testimony to identifying and explaining the sirrrilarities and dissirrrilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents. FDE Rauscher is precluded from
rendering any ultimate conclusions on authorship of the questioned documents and is sirrrilarly
precluded from testifying to the degree of confidence or certainty on which his opinions are
based." United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000). See also United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999) (expert testimony concerning the
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questioned document cases, they have sometimes applied it to other types of
forensic expertise such as firearms examinations. 69 Another court took a less
restrictive approach, ruling that the expert would be permitted to testify only
that it was "more likely than not" that recovered bullets and cartridge cases
came from a particular weapon. 70 Either of these approaches could be extended to other techniques, such as fingerprint comparisons.

IV. UNUSUAL AND NEW TECHNIQUES
Any new technique or extension of an older procedure is a good candidate
for challenge. For example, in Commonwealth v. Patterson,71 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that, although the traditional fingerprint
method was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, the same
was not demonstrated in the record when that methodology was applied to
simultaneous impressions. 72 Simultaneous impressions "are two or more friction ridge impressions from the fingers and/or palm of one hand that are determined to have been deposited at the same time." 73 The key, of course, is
determining whether the impressions were left at the same time and thus came
from the same person, rather than having been left by two different people at
different times. 74 The court remanded the case to the trial court.
Several toolmark cases are also illustrative. Although most courts have
admitted toolmark evidence, the Florida Supreme Court, in Ramirez v. State, 15
rejected the testimony of five experts who claimed general acceptance for a
process of matching a knife with a cartilage wound in a murder victim-a type

general similarities and differences between a defendant's handwriting exemplar and a stick up
note was admissible, but not the specific conclusion that the defendant was the author).
69. See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005). In response,
prosecutors could use demonstrative exhibits, such as in the Lindbergh kidnapping trial. For
illustrations of the handwriting charts in the Lindbergh case, see ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL.,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 370-72 (5th ed. 2007).
70. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
71. 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005).
72. ld. at 24, 29-30.
73. Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a
Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, FORENSIC Sci. COMM., Jan.
2006, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/researchl2006_0l_research02.htm. An FBI
review addressed this subject: "[I]f an item could only be held in a certain manner, then the only
way of explaining the evidence is that the multiple prints are from the single person. In some
cases, identifying simultaneous prints may infer, for example, the manner in which a knife was
held." ld. However, this review found that there was not even agreement on what constitutes a "simultaneous impression," and therefore more explicit guidelines were needed. ld.
74. "[T]he examiner apparently may take into account the distance separating the latent
impressions, the orientation of the impressions, the pressure used to make the impression, and any
other facts the examiner deems relevant. The record does not, however, indicate that there is any
approved standardized method for making the determination that two or more print impressions
have been made simultaneously." Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 18.
75. 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001). Although the court applied Frye, it emphasized the lack of
testing, the paucity of "meaningful peer review," the absence of a quantified error rate, and the
lack of developed objective standards-that is, the Daubert factors. ld. at 849-52.
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of "tool mark" comparison. 76 In Sexton v. State, 77 an expert testified that cartridge cases from unfired bullets found in the appellant's apartment had distinct marks that matched fired cartridge cases found at the scene of the
offense. 78 The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals ruled the testimony inadmissible: "This record qualifies Crumley as a firearms identification expert, but
does not support his capacity to identify cartridge cases on the basis of magazine marks only." 79

V. LACK OF STANDARDS
The NRC report found the lack of standards in examining evidence to be
troublesome: "Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic practice in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place (e.g., [Scientific Working Group] standards), they often are vague and not enforced in any
meaningful way." 80 In another section, the report noted that some disciplines
"need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective interpretations
and pursue equally rigorous research and evaluation programs." 81
Experts in some cartridge identification cases failed to follow any protocol. In Monteiro, the expert did not malce any sketches or take any photographs.82 Thus, adequate documentation was lacking. As a result, the court
wrote: "Until the basis for the identification is described in such a way that the
procedure performed by [the examiner] is reproducible and verifiable, it is
inadmissible under Rule 702." 83 In Green, the court noted that, although the
expert had seven years of experience in the field, he was not certified, and his
laboratory was not accredited. 84 Moreover, he had never formally been tested
by a neutral proficiency examination. 85 "And although he relied on his past
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his
past observations." 86

76. !d. at 852.
77.93 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
78. !d. at 98.
79. "[T]he magazine or magazines that made the marks upon which Crumley based his
identification were not found by the police. Therefore Crumley was not able to make test marks
for comparison. Also, Crumley did not say whether he was familiar with the manufacturing process of the magazine or magazines that he said left identifiable marks on the Jive rounds and cartridge cases." !d. at 101.
80. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
81. !d. at 8.
82. United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006).
83. !d.
84. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
85. !d.
86. !d.
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VI. EVIDENTIARY RULES
Two evidentiary rules may play a role in admitting some of the NRC
report's findings into criminal trials: the learned treatise hearsay exception and
the judicial notice doctrine.

A. Learned Treatise Exception
Learned treatises were admissible at common law but only for the impeachment of experts. 87 Federal Evidence Rule 803(18) changed this result,
making the treatise admissible as substantive evidence by recognizing a hearsay exception for such texts. 88 According to the federal drafters, "the hearsay
objection must be regarded as unimpressive when directed against treatises
since a high standard of accuracy is engendered by various factors: the treatise
is written primarily and impartially for professionals, subject to scrutiny and
exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake." 89
The rule refers to "published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets," including those on "science" if "established as a reliable authority by the testimony
or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice."90 One would assume that a report prepared by one of the foremost scientific institutions in the nation, at the direction of Congress, after more than a
two year study, would qualify as reliable. 91 If so, the prosecution expert could
be required to read selected passages from the report during crossexamination. 92

B. Judicial Notice
Federal Evidence Rule 201 (b) provides that a court may judicially notice
an adjudicative fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ...
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accu-

87. Some jurisdictions still follow the traditional rule. E.g.. MICH. R. EVID. 707 (treatises
"admissible for impeachment purposes only"). See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI,
UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE§ 33.16 (3d ed. 2009).
88. Two limitations appear in the rule. First, a treatise may be used substantively only when
an expert is on the stand. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). This requirement provides an important safeguard because it ensures that a knowledgeable person is available "to explain and assist in the
application of the treatise .... " ld. (Advisory Committee's Note, exception (18)). Second, the
treatise may be read to the jury but not received as an exhibit, thus precluding its misuse in the
jury room. Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1414 (lOth Cir. 1990) (noting that permitting a
treatise in the jury room raises the danger that jurors will be unduly impressed by the treatise).
89. FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (Advisory Committee's Note, exception (18)).
90. ld.
91. The NRC committee, which was established in the fall of 2006, met eight times. "During
these meetings, the committee heard expert testimony and deliberated over the information it
heard and received. Between meetings, committee members reviewed numerous published materials, studies, and reports related to the forensic science disciplines, engaged in independent research
on the subject, and worked on drafts of the final report." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
92. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). The rule of completeness may permit the prosecutor to have other
passages of the report read to the jury at the same time. FED. R. EVID. 106.
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racy cannot reasonably be questioned." 93 As the Supreme Court has noted:
"[T]heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201."94
Once a scientific principle is sufficiently established, a court may take
judicial notice of the validity of that principle. The principles underlying many
forensic techniques, including radar, intoxication tests, fingerprints, palm
prints, firearms identification, handwriting comparisons, DNA profiling,
blood-spatter evidence, as well as other procedures have all been judicially
recognized in this fashion. 95 But judicial notice is not so limited. The 1992
National Academy of Sciences report listed a number of facts concerning
DNA that could be judicially noticed. 96 There are numerous passages in the
recent NRC report that are comparable. Statements about the subjectivity of
many forensic techniques 97 and the lack of empirical testing come to mind.
-----~-----

In the long run, the NRC recommendations, if adopted, would benefit law
enforcement and prosecutors. The recommendations would allow forensic
science to develop a strong scientific basis and limit evidentiary challenges
regarding the reliability of forensic evidence. At the moment, however, courts
will confront serious challenges. Even if forensic testimony is limited, standards are followed, and findings in particular cases are documented, the underlying problem remains-that is, lack of research. 98 The report concluded

93. FED. R. EVID. 20!(b). See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE
ch. 44 (3d ed. 2009).
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.ll (1993).
95. See I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. lMWINKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE§
1.02, at 3-5 nn.I0-23 (4th ed. 2007) (listing cases).
96. The report slated:
The study of DNA polymorphisms can, in principle, provide a reliable method for comparing
samples.
Each person's DNA is unique (except that of identical twins), although the actual
discriminatory power of any particular DNA test will depend on the sites of DNA variation
examined.
The current laboratory procedure [RFLP] for detecting DNA variation (specifically, singlelocus probes analyzed on Southern blots without evidence of band shifting) is fundamentally
sound, although the validity of any particular implementation of the basic procedure will depend on proper characterization of the reproductibilily of the system (e.g., measurement
variation) and the inclusion of all necessary scientific controls.
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH CoUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 149 (1992).
97. "But even with more training and experience using newer techniques, the decision of the
toolmark examiner remains a subjective decision based on unarticulated standards and no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 153-54.
98. This underlying problem is noted in the Summary section of the NRC report:
Some of the forensic science disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial DNA
analysis, toxicology and drug analysis); others are based on expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, writing samples, toolrnarks, bite marks, and specimens such as hair) ....
There are also sharp distinctions between forensic practitioners who have been trained in chemistry,
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that "some forensic science disciplines are supported by little rigorous systematic research to validate the discipline's basic premises and techniques. There
is no evident reason why such research cannot be conducted."99 In a later passage, the report returned to this point: "[N]o forensic method other than nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about
'individualization' (more commonly known as 'matching' of an unknown item
of evidence to a specific known source). " 100 In particular, the report recognized deficiencies in many common forensic techniques. For example, the
report made the following observation about firearms identification: "Because
not enough is known about the variabilities among individual tools and guns,
we are not able to specify how many points of similarity are necessary for a
given level of confidence in the result." 101 Further, "[t]he scientific basis for
handwriting comparisons needs to be strengthened." 102 Similarly, "[t]here is no
science on the reproducibility of the different methods of [bite-mark] analysis
that lead to conclusions about the probability of a match." 103
This state of affairs presents courts with an immediate challenge. As the
report comments: "[T]here are serious issues regarding the capacity and quality of the current forensic science system; yet, the courts continue to rely on
forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the limitations
of different forensic science disciplines." 104

biochemistry, biology, and medicine (and who bring these disciplines to bear in their work) and
technicians who lend support to forensic science enterprises.

NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
99. !d. at 22. In addressing the lack of funding, the report commented: "Of the various facets
of underresourcing, the committee is most concerned about the knowledge base. Adding more
dollars and people to the enterprise might reduce case backlogs, but it will not address fundamentallimitations in the capabilities of forensic science disciplines to discern valid information from
crime scene evidence." Id. at 15. Similar statements are found elsewhere in the report. "A body of
research is required to establish the limits and measures of performance and to address the impact
of sources of variability and potential bias. Such research is sorely needed, but it seems to be
lacking in most of the forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of matching characteristics. These disciplines need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research and evaluation programs." !d. at 8.
100. !d. at 87.
101. !d. at 154. "The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated." NRC BALLISTIC
IMAGING, supra note 54, at 81.
102. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 166.
103. "No thorough study has been conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness
of bite marks; theoretical studies promoting the uniqueness theory include more teeth than are seen
in most bite marks submitted for comparison. There is no central repository of bite marks and
patterns." !d. at 174.
104. !d. at 85.
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